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A B S T R A C T   
What is needed for the private sector to successfully establish itself as a key player in delivering 
sustainable sanitation in the Global South? The present paper aims to offer some answers to this 
through the case of Peepoople AB, a company delivering a single-use biodegradable toilet bag in 
informal settlements. The company aimed to but failed in combining sustainable development of 
sanitation and financial gain for investors. We suggest that explanations for the failure can be 
found in the interaction between the company and the development– and aid organisations 
already involved in sanitation development. Through Strategic Niche Management, we look at 
whether the company managed to create relevant social networks, expectation dynamics and 
learning processes. The company gained legitimacy with end users, but failed to gain legitimacy 
in the development sector as it did not prioritise the kind of learning and competence considered 
relevant in the sector.   
1. Introduction 
Nowadays the private sector has been assigned a key role in development, with significant hopes placed on quicker, more efficient 
and consumer-oriented sustainable development (Bitzer and Glasbergen, 2015; Ghosh and Rajan, 2019; Hall and Lobina, 2006; 
McEwan et al., 2017). One arena in which the private sector has been given a particularly prominent role is in technology development 
for the poor (McEwan et al., 2017). 
Sanitation has historically been one of the least prioritised areas on the global development agenda due to high capital investment 
costs, social taboos and the inherent complexity around technology adoption and implementation. Global sanitation statistics make 
depressing reading, with two billion people still lacking basic sanitation, causing over 400,000 diarrheal deaths annually and a much 
larger number of non-fatal cases of disease (WHO, 2019). In response to the sanitation challenge, the sector has seen an increased 
interest in the role of private investment and innovations, particularly for urban informal settlements in the Global South. 
Private sector engagement in sanitation development is characterised by solutions that aim to combine human wellbeing and 
environmental improvements with making a profit (Fejerskov, 2017). The increasing participation of the private sector in sanitation 
development warrants a closer scrutiny of how the sector integrates with the established development apparatus of large government 
and intragovernmental organisations and NGOs that have historically dominated the sanitation regime in the Global South. It also 
raises questions about the kinds of development issues and actors that are either targeted or left out when there is a profit incentive 
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(Blowfield and Dolan, 2014; Schurman, 2018). 
This paper presents a case in which a new sanitation solution, the Peepoo bag developed by the Swedish company Peepoople AB, 
aimed to combine profit for investors with development improvements in informal settlements. The Peepoo bag is a single-use 
biodegradable plastic bag containing a pad of urea that absorbs and breaks down pathogens (Vinnerås et al., 2009). Peepoople AB 
was founded in 2006 and liquidated in 2016 due to lack of financial viability. The company’s most comprehensive engagement was in 
the Kibera informal settlement in Nairobi, where it for a limited period gave households and schools subsidised access to the bag 
through donor funding (Kokko, 2019). 
Kibera is one of the largest informal settlements in Africa with a likely population of over half a million residents (Schouten and 
Mathenge, 2010). The settlement is located in hilly terrain, partly on a floodplain and like other informal settlements, it is charac-
terised by government failure to provide effective structural planning and municipal services, including for water and sanitation. In 
this void of an adequate solution serving all residents, several civil society– and private sector initiatives have emerged providing 
communal pit-latrines as well as various portable- and in-house sanitation solutions. Many of these have not lasted over time, often due 
to financial or structural constraints with regard to emptying and removal of waste (van Welie et al., 2019). As an indication of the 
inadequacy of access to sanitation, figures from 2004, which was the period just preceding the introduction of the Peepoo bag, 
suggested that 150 people shared one pit latrine in Kibera, resulting in a significantly higher use frequency than they are designed for 
(Schouten and Mathenge, 2010). Not having access to an adequate toilet solution is a cause of significant stress for Kibera’s residents. It 
also leads to exposure to violence and diarrheal related illnesses (Kokko, 2019). 
The Peepoo bag provides a solution to many of the sanitation-related constraints faced by people living in informal settlements. It 
can be used in the home, but it does not require much space, and it can be used without the need for additional devices, placed over a 
used tin can, for example. Like other forms of waste that have to be disposed, it needs to be collected and ideally removed from the 
settlement. However, the sanitizing effect of the urea means that the bag does not contribute to the spread of pathogens and resulting 
diseases in the same way as other available toilets (Vinnerås et al., 2009). 
Previous studies of the Peepoo case have focused on the sanitizing effect of the urea (Vinnerås et al., 2009) and on user perspectives 
(Kokko and Lagerkvist, 2017; Lagerkvist et al., 2014). This body of work shows that despite initial scepticism among end users, many 
became positive about using the bag. Women particularly appreciated it for its usefulness in situations when it is difficult to leave the 
house, such as when caring for small children, at night and during illness. Women with access to the bag also reported that their 
children were ill less often (Lagerkvist et al., 2014), which is an anticipated result of reduced exposure to pathogens (Vinnerås et al., 
2009). However, consumer-oriented research on the Peepoo bag has been unable to explain why, despite the local benefits and 
appreciation of the bag amongst Kibera’s residents, it failed to penetrate the niche as a successful private sector sanitation solution. 
Since the failure of Peepoople AB to successfully combine financial gain for investors and development cannot be explained by 
studying consumers, this paper turns to the activities and relationships that needed to be in place for the company to successfully 
deliver its sanitation solution to end users, i.e. other actors in the sanitation and development regime. In another publication (Kokko, 
2019) we describe the importance of the lack of engagement with Kenyan authorities and experts for the failure of the bag to take hold 
as a local sanitation solution. In the present paper we instead focus on relationships with the wider set of globally active donor and aid 
organizations which represent key players in the field of sanitation development in the Global South (Fejerskov, 2017; van Welie et al., 
2019) and from which the company needed to secure support and funding. Unsuccessful interaction with these organizations was 
shown to be of key importance for the failure of the company to deliver its sanitation solution, as will be described. 
We place our study in the wider context of the private sector’s growing engagement in development (Blowfield and Dolan, 2014; 
Fejerskov, 2017; Schurman, 2018) and draw on frameworks from the field of sustainability transitions (Schot and Geels, 2008) and 
strategic niche management (SNM) (Kemp et al., 1998). We focus our analysis on three related processes that the literature has 
indicated need to be in place for a niche innovation to successfully penetrate a regime:1) expectation dynamics, 2) social network 
dynamics and 3) learning processes (Geels and Raven, 2006). 
Previous research shows that the company focused a great deal and spent considerable resources on establishing beneficial 
expectation dynamics, social network dynamics and learning processes among certain groups of end users in Kibera – largely suc-
cessfully (Kokko, 2019). However, we will show here that the company failed to establish the same dynamics in relation to more 
powerful actors currently active in the regime, such as the development agencies operating in the field. We suggest that this is 
potentially an important reason for its ultimate failure. As such, our study provides an example of how the private sector’s increasing 
involvement in development in general (Blowfield and Dolan, 2014), and in the sanitation sector specifically (Fejerskov, 2017), might 
play out, and highlights the importance of moving beyond a market focus on consumers to understand the success or failure of private 
sector sanitation development. 
2. Conceptual Framework 
In recent years, the field of transition studies has increasingly addressed issues of how to transform societies for increased sus-
tainability (e.g. Shove and Walker, 2010). A cornerstone of these studies is recognition that technologies do not work in isolation, but 
are interconnected with multiple actors, organisations and users, i.e. they form socio-technical systems (Lawhon and Murphy, 2012). 
Much of the literature describing socio-technical transitions is derived from high-income countries, although the concept is increasing 
being applied to low-income areas (e.g. Ramos-Mejía et al., 2018; van Welie et al., 2019). 
Transition studies are often framed using a multi-level perspective in which changes in socio-technical systems are understood as 
being influenced at three levels: landscape, regime and niche (Fig. 1). A niche represents an area of new development and radical 
innovation (Geels, 2002). New sanitation technologies aimed at serving informal settlements, such as the Peepoo bag, are typical 
K. Fischer et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 38 (2021) 68–78
70
examples of niche innovations attempting to penetrate the existing sanitation regime (Fejerskov, 2017; Cherunya et al., 2020). In this 
study, the niche innovation offers a new technology and a new way of organising sanitation delivery – namely through a private 
business. Regimes are dominant ways of doing things and include the technical infrastructure, users and organisations. In order to 
succeed, the niche needs to be integrated into the regime or needs to destabilise the regime so that the innovation becomes the new 
norm (Geels and Schot, 2007). In the absence of functional government support, the local sanitation regime in Kibera is strongly 
influenced by actors from the development aid sector. The landscape consists of slow-changing trends, e.g. ideologies around what a 
proper toilet should be, and economic and environmental conditions, which influence the other levels, but is not examined in this 
paper (however see Kokko, 2019). 
Early developmental engagement by former colonial powers in the Global South focused on the transfer of heavy and inflexible 
technologies (such as irrigation systems) for implementation and adoption by end users without adaptation (i.e. aiming to directly 
substitute regime technology) (Cherlet, 2014; Kragelund, 2004). In light of the failure of these inflexible technologies to be adopted 
and bring about sustainable change in the developing world, in the 1990s ideas about technology development shifted to place an 
emphasis on the need for local adaptation and flexibility in technologies (Fejerskov, 2017). Simultaneously the private sector was 
given more space to engage in development (Kragelund, 2004). 
The idea of flexible technologies allowing for on-site experimentation is the core of the SNM framework (Kemp et al., 1998). The 
starting point in SNM is that technology adoption is never only about optimising the technology, but is also about social change. It is 
based on a lesson that it should be possible to change the technology when it is introduced in the social setting, i.e. there is need for 
local experimentation and adaptation of the technology in the niche to enable successful adoption (Schot and Geels, 2008). In the 
complex environments of the poor, this room for local adaptation is likely to be particularly important, as indicated by research on the 
adoption of pro-poor technology more generally (Reece and Sumberg, 2003; Sumberg and Okali, 1997). Innovators, particularly from 
the private sector, have taken up the idea of local experiments, aiming to develop sanitation solutions for informal settlements. In this 
context the lack of a comprehensive sanitation solution serving everyone is not only seen as a constraint to be resolved but as an 
opportunity for niche innovations (Cherunya et al., 2020; Fejerskov, 2017; Montgomery et al., 2017). 
The literature related to SNM has investigated which processes and factors determine the successful development of the niche 
(Schot and Geels, 2008). Key interrelated processes have been defined as being related to 1) expectation dynamics, 2) social network 
dynamics and 3) learning processes (Geels and Raven, 2006). 
Expectation dynamics are related to the visions and claims that different actors associate with the niche innovation (Schot and 
Geels, 2008). New technologies either have to accommodate different expectations or expectations have to be modified through active 
engagement with those being targeted by innovation, as well as those having significant influence over its development (Hegger et al., 
2007). Substantiated (realistic) and shared expectations will increase the acceptance and legitimacy of the innovation (Schot and 
Geels, 2008; Bergek et al., 2008; Bork et al., 2015). In this study, we analyse whether expectations for Peepoo among different actors 
were compatible and whether the necessary legitimacy for the niche innovation was created. Legitimacy is both a matter of social 
acceptance and compliance with relevant institutions. In line with previous studies on technology legitimacy we here conceptualise 
legitimacy broadly as “the perceived consonance of an entity with a socially constructed set of norms, values, beliefs and practices in its 
context” (Markard et al., 2016: 331). 
Fig. 1. The concept of socio-technical transitions framing this study. Niche innovations and regimes are formed by users, organisations and 
technology. Changes in the regime occur through interactions with the niche and the wider landscape. Key dynamics and processes influencing the 
uptake of a niche innovation are highlighted along the trajectory (adapted from Geels, 2002). 
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Social network dynamics relate to coalition building, trust and tensions. This process is important for creating a supportive 
community around the niche, which will provide the necessary resources, both human and capital. In this context, it is clearly 
important that the actors involved in the social networks have the capacity and commitment within their organisations to provide the 
necessary resources (Schot and Geels, 2008; Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011). Resource mobilisation has been identified in other inno-
vation research as a critical function shaping the potential for niche development (Bergek et al., 2008). In this study, we analyse 
whether the Peepoo innovation and innovator were able to build coalitions and mobilise the necessary resources to successfully 
establish the new innovation in the niche. 
The development of any new technology is intertwined with learning processes related to technology and market development 
(Kemp et al., 1998). Learning processes relate to the accumulation, adaptation and sharing of knowledge of a new technology by 
individuals and in networks (Hekkert et al., 2011; Schot and Geels, 2008). Included in learning processes are also the views among 
actors of what kind of knowledge is needed to successfully penetrate the regime and achieve sustainable sanitation. We pay particular 
attention to the kind of knowledge that was seen as important among the actors involved for achieving sustainable sanitation. Here we 
add the concept of epistemic community (Haas, 1992) for conceptualizing how a shared understanding of the Peepoo bag was created 
within the social network established around the development of the innovation. Epistemic community as a concept helps us 
emphasize the discursive dimension of the resource mobilization and alliance building in the social network, and the interconnec-
tedness between the factors of social network dynamics and learning processes. Within a social network, actors support and reinforce 
each other’s worldviews, while at the same time resisting challenges to their shared worldview from the outside. The establishment of 
an epistemic community thus hinders epistemic reflexivity (Rodríguez de Francisco and Boelens, 2015), i.e. the possibility to 
reflexively scrutinize one’s own knowledge claims and the conditions under which they are valid (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) 
Table 1 summarises how we conceptualise expectation dynamics, social network dynamics and learning processes in this study 
(Table 1). 
Importantly, while much of recent sanitation technology development has focused on adapting technology to its end users, and 
academic studies and evaluations have similarly focused on the success or failure of adaptation by looking at end users’ perspectives 
(Kokko and Lagerkvist, 2017; Cherunya et al., 2020), the SNM framework, in line with the multilevel perspective in transition studies 
(Lawhon and Murphy, 2012; Geels, 2011), acknowledges that expectation dynamics, social network dynamics and learning processes 
not only have to be established successfully with local end users, but also with other actors and institutions that are impacted by or 
have an impact on the technology and its development and introduction (Schot and Geels, 2008). 
3. Material and methods 
The study reported here is situated in a larger longitudinal case study on the introduction of the Peepoo bag in Kibera (Kokko, 
2019). Interviews drawn on in the present study are listed in Table 2 
The interviews were semi-structured with focus on the story of Peepoople AB from the interviewee’s perspective, with particular 
details regarding aspects about which the interviewee was particularly knowledgeable. In addition, important insights about the case 
are drawn from a stakeholder meeting on sustainable sanitation arranged in January 2018 by the first and second author together with 
the NGO International Aid Services (IAS) that took over the Peepoo bag after Peepoople AB closed down. The meeting was attended by 
31 participants engaged in sanitation and development in Kenya, including several NGOs working with sanitation issues in Kibera, city 
and county government officials, researchers who had been involved in the development and trials of the Peepoo bag from Sweden and 
Kenya, and former staff of Peepoople AB. 
Lastly, the first author analysed all Peepoople AB’s annual reports and additional company information registered with the Swedish 
Companies Registration Office, such as proof of company registration listing the CEO, chairperson and members of the board, 
describing the ownership structure and all applications for new share issues, for example. The first author also investigated the ac-
ademic backgrounds, employment histories and role in the company of all board members and the majority of all employees to identify 
the kind of knowledge prioritised in the company and how this changed over time. A large number of media posts about the bag, 
including those re-posted on Peepoople’s own website (www.peepoople.com), and in several newspapers and magazines were ana-
lysed to get a picture of how the bag was depicted in society at the time. 
All the material was coded thematically, with a focus on identifying descriptions of events, thoughts and perspectives from Pee-
poople staff and other regime actors related to expectation dynamics, social networks and learning processes, as described in the 
theoretical framework. Quotations from interviews not originally conducted in English have been translated by the first author. 
4. Results 
In what follows we tell a chronological story of the Peepoo bag and Peepoople AB, with focus on the expectations, social network 
dynamics, and learning processes that were created during the development and implementation processes. The story is subsequently 
discussed in the light of literature on private sector in development with the aim of better understanding the key factors of influence for 
integrating a niche innovation in a sanitation regime in the Global South. 
4.1. A social network for the Peepoo bag 
The idea of the Peepoo bag came about when an architect visiting an informal settlement in Bombay met a women’s group who told 
him that they did not need help with building houses; what they needed was a sanitation solution. The architect took the problem home 
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with him and started a process of working out what a modern toilet that could function in these women’s local context might look like. 
Based on the living conditions and monetary constraints characterising the kinds of informal settlements in which these women lived, 
he concluded that the solution had to be affordable and possible to use in places with limited space. Ideally too, it should not add to the 
burden on the already constrained waste situation in informal settlements. The idea of a niche innovation of a biodegradable toilet bag 
emerged in 2005 (Fig. 2). 
To successfully integrate the niche innovation into the sanitation regime of informal settlements, the architect aimed to gain 
legitimacy and financial support from dominant actors in the regime at the time, i.e. aid and development agencies and sanitation 
experts focusing on the Global South. However, this group of people were very sceptical about the toilet bag idea. The fact that the 
innovation was a simple plastic bag, which the architect saw as a benefit because it replicated a sanitation solution already in use 
locally1, was seen as obstructing the work of government and development agencies to eliminate practices of open defecation, and the 
use of plastic bags for this purpose. There was also a strong idea in the sector that sanitation development involved moving away from 
bags and having access to something seemingly more permanent, such as a proper toilet with a cabin and a seat. Clearly, there was no 
shared idea between the architect and actors in this sector about what a successful solution to sanitation in informal settlements would 
look like, and he failed to convince them of his idea. An important reason for this was that the development sector did not see the 
architect as a legitimate actor. The architect experienced that he was viewed with disbelief due to his inexperience in the sector and 
that his ideas were not seen as realistic or substantiated by previous experience: 
They [the aid workers] thought that we were arrogant in saying that we had the solution to one of the world’s biggest problems. 
They were annoyed by us coming and saying that we had the solution. 
The clash of cultures between the private sector and the development sector can also be exemplified in the way in which the ar-
chitect described to us how, when meeting people in aid organizations, he encountered a very different culture to the one he was used 
to in the private sector. In his view, the culture of the development sector was highly controlling, inflexible and conservative. He was 
frustrated with the high and strict demands on control over invested money and implementation, the heavy bureaucracy, and the 
demands for paperwork and check-ups: 
Some people do the assessments, then other people perform an evaluation […]. And then they make an assessment, and then 
this is evaluated. It just goes round and round like this. It’s crazy […] Instead of all these measurements, we could have given – 
Table 1 
Interrelated processes of importance for successful niche innovation (inspired by Geels and Raven, 2006, and Haas, 1992).  
Expectation dynamics Social network dynamics Learning processes 
Visions and claims associated with the innovation. 
Creation of substantiated and shared 
expectations.Important for creating legitimacy 
for the innovation and innovator. 
Coalition building, trust and tensions. Creation 
of a supportive community around the 
innovation.Important for mobilizing the 
necessary resources. 
Knowledge creation, knowledge sharing and 
adaptation. Includes views about what kind of 
knowledge is needed and creation of a shared 
understanding about the innovation (epistemic 
community).  
Table 2 
Interviews drawn on in the analysis.  
Period Data 
collector 











Researcher part of the core team developing 
the bag 















First author Scientist part of the core team developing 
the bag 
Swedish Face to face Handwritten notes 
January 
2018 
First author Scientist evaluating the bag in Kibera English Face to face Handwritten notes 
January 
2018 
First author Former employee Peepoople Kenya English Face to face Handwritten notes 
May 2020 First author Former owner and chair-person Peepoople 
AB 
Swedish Telephone Handwritten notes 
May 2020 First author Scientist part of the core team developing 
the bag 
Swedish Face to face Handwritten notes  
1 In the absence of better alternatives, in many informal settlements people make use of plastic bags for defecating. These are often referred to as 
‘flying toilets’. 
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because it cost millions – we could have provided sanitation to more and more children instead. I don’t need measurements to 
tell me that this would be better. Right? 
While disappointed with the rigidity of the development sector and its apparent lack of appreciation for his idea, the architect 
instead found support amongst natural scientists and engineers in Sweden working on sanitation with the goal of developing circular 
and more environmentally sustainable sanitation solutions. These scientists were already performing sanitation experiments with urea 
in bags, so for them the idea of a toilet bag was both realistic and substantiated by evidence from their research. A supportive social 
network of the researchers and the architect was thus created building on shared expectations of a biodegradable toilet bag. A double 
layered bag of biodegradable plastic was developed to hold a mix of urea that would kill pathogens, and in 2006 a listed for-profit 
company with a social mission was established. Initially the architect/founder was both the CEO and the chairperson of the board, 
holding over 90 % of the shares. Additional members of the board were the wife of the architect, with a background in design, and one 
of the sanitation scientists. 
4.2. Peepoople – an epistemic community of engineering, business and finance 
As a functional version of the bag took shape, and the bag was introduced in trials in Kibera (as will be described later), the Swedish 
team involved in developing the bag managed to attract a number of private investors. These investors all had backgrounds in business 
and engineering with focus on markets in the Global North. One of the investors with business experience and an interest in sus-
tainability became the new chair of the board and an external CEO with a background in industrial engineering was appointed. 
This development indicates how the niche innovation, while failing to gain legitimacy and support from the development sector, 
found an alternative pathway opening up: that of the business world and environmentally-conscious investors. Our analysis indicates 
that a strong epistemic community was formed within the community of investors and board members with the shared general idea 
that capital accumulation would facilitate a move toward increased sustainability, and more specifically that the Peepoo bag would be 
able to deliver this. These shared expectations created an important basis for the will to invest in the innovation and as such facilitated 
the company’s rapid growth. The spread of this discursive support outside the core group of investors is also indicated in how the bag 
and the architect received positive attention in the Swedish and international business and tech-oriented media (e.g. Borrell, 2010; 
Economist, 2010; Roxvall, 2010), and in how the bag won an award for its sustainable design (Peepoople, 2010). 
In 2011, yet new owners from the finance and investment sector joined the company and from 2012 the founder was no longer the 
largest owner and shareholder. There were now six major owners holding 84 % of the company’s shares in all. Apart from the founder 
and his wife with their backgrounds in architecture and design and one of the sanitation researchers, all the other investors and board 
members came from the engineering, business and finance sectors. 
The number of employees also grew quickly from five in 2011 to its maximum of ten people employed simultaneously in 
2012–2014, the majority of whom had backgrounds in engineering and business and were working in technology development or 
marketing and sales. Of the 15 employees that we could trace, nine had engineering or business backgrounds. Of those in leading 
positions, all had competence in engineering, business or design. This clearly indicates what that the company valued as relevant 
knowledge and competence. No one in the board or in a management position had documented experience from working with 
Fig. 2. Demonstration picture: how to use the Peepoo bag (downloaded from https://www.flickr.com/photos/gtzecosan/6082543470/ licensed 
under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license). 
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sanitation development in the Global South, or more generally with poverty related issues. The only context-specific knowledge that 
we could find as valued by the company was understanding consumers’ preferences in Kibera. For this purpose, researchers of con-
sumer behaviour were hired to study market uptake and consumer preferences. The bag continued to receive significant positive media 
attention in the Swedish and international media (Alpman, 2013; Borrell, 2010; Economist, 2020) and was awarded an additional 
sustainability prize (Hagström, 2012). 
The investment–will and significant risk taking in the company can be exemplified in the large investments prior to market 
establishment. In 2011, a seven million euro investment enabled upgrading from small-scale semi-manual to automated production of 
the bags. Interviews with previous employees and board members testify that the idea was that scaling up production and having bags 
ready to deliver would substantiate claims of the bag being a realistic and available sanitation solution, which would boost sales. 
During 2012–2013, the company made additional significant investments funded by the issue of new shares and subscription warrants. 
4.3. The social network faces obstacles 
The bag was now well-established in the business world as an up-and-coming, promising sanitation solution (e.g. Dagens PS., 
2013). However in order for its use to be scaled up from the trials in Kibera, and to become accessible more broadly, the bag still had to 
be embraced as a legitimate solution by humanitarian and development organisations. The company’s development strategy was based 
on the assumption that organisations working with emergency relief and in refugee camps would embrace the product, which would 
get sales off the ground. Sales to these organisations were expected to generate sufficient financial gain to enable selling the bag at a 
subsidised price to users in non-emergency situations, such as urban informal settlements. For this purpose, Peepoople sales staff 
travelled the world twice a month to promote the bag to these humanitarian organisations. The bag would indeed provide a suitable 
sanitation solution in such contexts with a minimal need for infrastructure apart from distribution and collection. It would significantly 
reduce the spread of pathogens and would also ease the burden on the local environment. However, our interviews revealed that the 
sales staff recruited by Peepoople had been hired for their ability to sell lifestyle products to prosperous consumers in the Global North, 
with the idea that this kind of sales competence was generaliseable. Clearly, this was not the case. Our interviews revealed a significant 
clash of cultures between the sales staff, with their well-dressed appearance and aggressive marketing style, and the humanitarian 
workers being targeted. This can be exemplified by how one of the scientists we interviewed described to us how (s)he had recently met 
a worker from one of the large humanitarian organisations who had been approached by the Peepoo sales staff and had rejected the 
Peepoo bag. When the scientist explained the benefits of the bag in the refugee context, the aid worker responded: ‘Oh, so the bag 
actually works!?’ which was not at all her impression after meeting the Swedish sales staff. This is one example of how Peepoople failed 
to build trust and thereby legitimacy in the development and humanitarian sector. A major reason for this was that the development 
workers did not see the sales staff as competent or trustworthy. It is also an example of how the epistemic community created within 
Peepoople, with ideas about generalisability of business and marketing competence, and the lack of attention to context, was important 
for the company’s failure to make an adequate analysis of its market. 
We also notice that the company’s attention at this time was primarily to secure sales to please the new owners who had invested 
large sums of money on the back of a promise of a successful product. As such, our interviews report on an environment where the push 
to sell the bags ‘at all cost’ was prioritized over delivering sustainable sanitation. In the words of a former employee: ‘We felt like we 
weren’t working for the product anymore; we were working to please the investors’. 
4.4. Creating a social network, legitimacy and learning with end users 
In parallel with the company’s growth in Sweden, trials started in 2008 in the large informal settlement of Kibera in Nairobi, Kenya, 
in which 30 households were invited to test the first trial bags. An NGO was also established, Peepoople Kenya, which was to be the 
sister organization of the for-profit venture in Sweden. The idea was that delivering the bag through a local NGO, would make it easier 
to create legitimacy for the product in Kibera, which would facilitate its adoption and spread. The local staff was employed for three 
months at a time to allow flexibility for the organization. 
The Peepoo bag was being trialled in Kibera because the architect had a contact there who knew a local pastor who was persuaded 
of the benefits of the sanitation bag. Local elders were also engaged early on in the process to ensure legitimacy for the product (Kokko, 
2019). Many people were initially reluctant to adopt the bag, for similar reasons to those that initially made the development sector 
sceptical. The bag was not seen as a real toilet, some felt that it was too small or undignified, and many were reluctant to pay for it. To 
overcome people’s reluctance to adopt the bag, Peepoople Kenya organized street shows in the form of theatre and music, as well as 
‘plot parties’ where the bag was demonstrated and residents were educated about hygiene. These investments, and the fact that 
Peepoople managed to gain support from local elders, and the locally trusted pastor were important for creating legitimacy for the bag 
in the local community. The activities, together with the school programme described below, also helped build shared and appropriate 
knowledge about the bag and about the importance of hygienic sanitation and hand-washing. 
The bags were subsequently introduced for sale to households in parts of Kibera through door to door sales by female sales staff 
employed by Peepoople. Subsequently sales were scaled up to local kiosks. The bags were purchased for 3 KSH per bag (equal to about 
0.02 USD and covering just 7 % of the bag’s total costs). Despite this seemingly low cost, the price was an important disincentive for 
resource-constrained households. At its peak, Peepoo sales reached 1000 individual users in Kibera. 
The Peepoople school programme attracted more donor funding than household sales, and was thus possible to scale up. At its peak 
in 2015, 100 schools covering over 17,000 children had daily access to Peepoo bags. Through the school programme children were 
trained in sanitation and hand-washing combined with positive reinforcement of correct behaviour, for example through competitions, 
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with the underlying purpose of encouraging behavioural change. The idea behind involving schools was also that children would get 
used to the Peepoo bags and would expect similar access to sanitation at home, as well as educate their families about the bag’s 
benefits. Thus, the idea was that it would lead to shared knowledge of the bag’s benefits and a demand for better access to sanitation. 
Our analysis indicates that it was not lack of appreciation for the product amongst consumers that limited the upscaling of Peepoo 
in Kibera, but rather the company’s failure to meet the consumers’ economic constraints and find sufficient funding to produce the bag. 
We also note that the trials in Kibera and the establishment of the local NGO were based on comparatively small and time-limited 
investments, completely dependent on donor funding. 
It is clear that Peepoople AB realized that they needed to understand their consumers and create legitimacy and demand for their 
product. At the same time the more limited investment of money in establishing the product in Kibera as compared with the money 
spent on establishing and promoting the company and product in Sweden, indicates that the company failed to acknowledge the time 
and resources needed to produce a lasting effect in the local context. 
4.5. Efforts to learn about the development sector come too late 
The fast growth and large investments made between 2011 and 2013 became difficult to sustain when the anticipated large market 
did not materialize, in particular, as a result of the failure to sell large quantities of bags to humanitarian relief programmes. As a 
response to this, new shares were released and new owners joined with the hope of keeping the company afloat. In 2014 the company 
had seven major owners who together owned 86 % of the shares. 
One of the new owners who joined in 2014 took over as chair of the board and CEO. He was critical of the quick upscaling and 
aimed to achieve slower growth and to gain legitimacy in in the development sector. At this stage it was clear that the company would 
not succeed in combining private gains with development aid, but nevertheless the company continued to attract positive media 
attention (e.g. Jejland, 2015). The firm started collaborating with International Aid Services (IAS), a small Swedish aid organization 
with lengthy experience of delivering water and sanitation in Africa. A plan was developed to give the product and brand to IAS. In 
2015 the first person with documented experience of development work joined the board. These events indicate an acknowledgement 
within the company for the first time of a need for experience from the development sector to gain the needed trust and legitimacy in 
that sector, but this shift in focus came too late. In 2015, the Swedish company wound up due to its lack of viability, and in 2016 the 
Peepoople brand and product were transferred free of charge to IAS. Production was substantially scaled down and relocated to Kenya, 
and some of the local Peepoople staff were employed by IAS in Kenya (IAS, 2016). Despite having returned to cheaper, semi-manual 
production of the bag, now located in Kenya, the cost of producing one bag is higher than a price that consumers in Kibera are willing 
or able to pay. This has been repeatedly emphasized as a problem that needs to be overcome by the new owners, indicating widespread 
belief in the need for a fully market-based solution to achieve sustainable sanitation in informal settlements. Table 3 summarises the 
key events in the chronological story told in sections 4.1 to 4.5 of the Peepoo bag and Peepoople AB (Table 3). With this chain of events 
Table 3 
Time table over key events in Peepoople’s history.  
Year Key events 
2005 The idea of a biodegradable toilet bag emerges after the architect has discussed sanitation with women in an informal settlement in Bombay. 
2006 After failing to get support from the development sector the architect meets with sanitation researchers. 
The architect, his wife and sanitation researchers create a stock-listed company with a social mission- Peepoople AB. 
2007  
2008 First trials are made in Kibera because the architect had contacts there. 
2009 
New investors and owners enter the company. 
The architect is replaced as chair of the board. A new CEO with experience from the packaging industry is recruited. 
Competence dominating the company: engineering, business and finance from Global North. 
2010 The architect wins a price in sustainable design for the Peepoo bag. 
A local office opens in Kibera to facilitate local production, marketing and distribution. 
2011 
Additional owners enter the company. The company has five employees. 
A large investment is made in equipment to speed up production. 
Donor funding secured for three years to expand from trial-distribution in Kibera. 
2012 
The architect is no longer the largest shareholder. 
The company now has ten employees. 
Competence dominating the company: engineering, business and finance from Global North. 
Scientists in business are engaged to study consumer’s preferences in KIbera. 
Additional significant investments are made in production and marketing. 
The bag is awarded a Swedish sustainability prize. 
2013  
2014 
The company’s investments in production and marketing has not led to anticipated purchases. New shares are released with a hope to keep the company 
afloat. 
A new owner becomes chair of the board and is critical of the high risk taking and quick upscaling. 
Contact is established with the NGO IAS. 
2015 
The school programme Kibera peaks with 100 schools having free access to the bag. Continued positive media attention in Sweden. 
The first board member with experience from the Global South enters. 
The company is closed down due to lack of viability. 
2016 Peepoople brand and product is transferred to IAS.  
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in mind, the next section discusses what we see as some of the likely reasons for the failure of the Peepoo bag as a niche innovation and 
as a sanitation business venture in informal settlements. 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
This study contributes evidence to the field of socio-technical transitions about an innovation introduced in a low-income setting. 
The findings exemplify how niche-regime interactions are as much about the use of technology as they are about human social re-
lations. Despite being a business failure, and as such also a failure of private sector involvement in development, the technology in 
itself offered benefits that were acknowledged by its end users. The bag was clearly appreciated by many of the individuals who had 
access to it for a period of time. For many, the bag led to improved health in term of absence of diseases, privacy, a feeling of cleanliness 
and hygiene, and increased sanitation access, in particular for many women, the elderly, the sick and children (Kokko and Lagerkvist, 
2017; Lagerkvist et al., 2014). This emphasizes that it is not only the suitability of the technology to the user context per se that is 
important for its success, but the wider social and political context as well . 
The study confirms that processes such as expectation dynamics, social network dynamics and learning processes are useful 
concepts for visualizing actor dynamics that are crucial to creating acceptance and adoption of new innovations. However, as pointed 
out by Schot and Geels (2008), this study also shows that attention needs to be paid to the scale and context in which the actors are 
active, and the associated power that they have to create change. For example, while the Swedish capital-strong investors had sig-
nificant resources to invest to launch the product, they did not have the necessary networks or competence to create legitimacy for the 
product amongst powerful actors in the development sector. Likewise, despite the company’s success in creating legitimacy for its 
innovation among consumers, these consumers had limited purchasing- and political power, and the company underestimated the 
resources needed to build trust and legitimacy among other, more resourceful actors affecting local context. 
The study points to the power of the discursive dimension of interaction between actors. To highlight the importance of this 
dimension we found it useful to add the concept of epistemic community (Haas, 1992). This helped us conceptualize the importance of 
the shared vision in the social network, and associated high expectations, both within the company and in the business and 
tech-oriented media, of a sustainable sanitation solution combining private gain with environmental improvements. This epistemic 
community was found to be an important basis for securing the initial financial resources in the company. The large investments 
coupled with high risk-taking exemplify what Fejerskov (2017) identifies as the new experimental focus of private sector involvement 
in sanitation technology for the Global South, in which large sums of money and considerable risks are seen as positive for stimulating 
novel thinking and creativity. 
However, the case also shows how an epistemic community can become destructive, as it hinders epistemic reflexivity (Rodríguez 
de Francisco and Boelens, 2015) preventing alternative perspectives and negative feedback to enter, thus obstructing important 
technology adaptation through learning. The knowledge valued by the company for obtaining success was strongly oriented to the kind 
of competence needed in other tech enterprises that aim to combine environmental benefits and financial gain (Fejerskov, 2017), 
namely engineering and business competence (see also Richey and Ponte, 2014). This, perhaps signifies a broader misconception 
within the epistemic community of philanthrocapitalist ventures in the Global South (Fejerskov, 2017), that generic competences in 
engineering and business are sufficient, ignoring the need for context specific competence. This case indicates that the epistemic 
community of business and engineering competence from the Global North created an important basis for experimentation and risk 
taking early in the process, but that at some point in time this epistemic community needs to open up and allow itself to be challenged 
by alternative perspectives. In the present case it is clear that this happened too late. 
The case also exemplifies how the tech culture of experimentation based on significant freedom and large investments clashed with 
a development aid culture involving considerable bureaucracy and conservatism. Fejerskov (2017) highlights this wish for a quick 
impact as typical of philanthrocapitalist tech ventures, and emphasizes that this is frequently accompanied by an avoidance of the slow 
and bureaucratic processes often associated with the involvement of state actors, as also suggested by Montgomery et al. (2017). While 
circumventing established actors in the development sector might have been important for the successful and rapid development of the 
niche innovation at an early stage (including the forming of the supportive epistemic community), it was impossible to continue 
without them if the innovation was to be established in the existing regime. The lack of appreciation of knowledge outside the tech- and 
business world led to a legitimacy crisis between the company and the development workers. This is noteworthy since the development 
sector has during the past decades welcomed private sector engagement to make development aid more efficient and 
consumer-oriented (e.g. Shurman, 2018). Our case suggests that despite this general tendency to embrace of the private sector in 
contemporary development discourses, this perspective might not have fully trickled down the development hierarchy to those 
employed in large humanitarian organizations. 
While Peepoople AB clearly failed to gain legitimacy for their innovation in the development sector, they had more success in the 
local user context in which trials took place. This also indicates that the company prioritized creating a market for its product through 
engaging with its consumers, a documented strategy used by the private sector in general (Rashid and Rahman, 2009; Blowfield and 
Dolan, 2014; Richey and Ponte, 2014). Indeed, successful development and implementation of niche innovations, requires legitimacy 
amongst its consumers (Hegger et al., 2007). This is equally important for ensuring democratic technology development (Montgomery 
et al., 2017; Roma and Jeffrey, 2010) and as such the focus on consumer preferences can be seen as an important improvement from 
the top-down technology interventions that characterized development programmes in the past (Cherlet, 2014). Our study, however, 
points out that this is not enough. To integrate niche innovations from the private sector in sanitation regimes, they also need to build 
social networks with powerful actors in the regime in order to create legitimacy and shared understandings of development. These 
actors include established international development organizations and actors from local political and economic institutions (Joshi 
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et al., 2011; Kokko, 2019). Two examples from the present case highlight how the Peepoo bag as a sustainable sanitation solution and 
its associated supportive epistemic community circumvented or failed to sufficiently appreciate and engage in the wider structures and 
processes that lead to unsustainable sanitation. Firstly, the poor humanitarian conditions with e.g. very limited space and lack of access 
to clean water and toilets, faced by women in informal settlements was taken by the architect as the starting point which the innovation 
needed to fit into. Clearly, it might be difficult for a technological innovation in isolation to solve structural societal challenges- but as 
noted here, technology is always part of a wider set of practices. In this case the company spent significant resources on promoting its 
toilet solution to its consumers. The company could have chosen to also lobby for more just access to sanitation. 
Secondly, and in relation to above, the company and other actors in support of the bag were of the idea that the end user must pay 
for the bag for it to be a sustainable solution. This perspective assumes a status quo in terms of the lack of responsibility that local 
political actors have taken so far in providing safe and affordable sanitation to all citizens in Kibera. It also fails to appreciate that 
sanitary systems both in the Global North as well as in formal settlements in the Global South, including in Nairobi, depend upon public 
investment in sewage infrastructure and/or other forms of subsidised access to safe sanitation. At a more general level, research has 
repeatedly shown that societies cannot become sustainable through a focus on consumers alone, since consumer power is not enough 
for creating the systemic change needed. This is particularly the case in contexts of the poor where consumers per definition have 
extremely low purchasing power. Here our study contributes to the evidence that market-based sanitation solutions alone are therefore 
unlikely to deliver sustainable sanitation for all (Fejerskov, 2017; Montgomery et al., 2017). 
On a concluding note, despite the challenges we have drawn attention to with regard to private sector in development, it can be 
noted that when the board of Peepoople AB realised that they had failed in combining profit-making with sustainable sanitation 
development, they chose to transfer the brand free of charge to an NGO. Despite a considerable personal economic loss, the architect 
did not necessarily view the whole experience as a failure: 
Even if it costs 400 million or 500 million. Even if it turns out in the end that it didn’t work out, there is still a value in all these 
failures […] It doesn’t matter what you fail at, because failures also have potential. Because you can build on it. If you get that, 
then very little money is wasted. The goal behind it has to be a good one. 
This indicates that the failures to create development outcomes through the private sector does not have to do with lack of will. The 
present case rather suggests that established discourses guiding private sector engagement in development, steering which knowledge 
that is prioritised, and leading to a narrow focus on consumers, are more important in hindering the private sector from contributing 
positively to improving poor people’s lives. 
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